Nigeria: Evolving Multidimensional Security & Economic Challenges
October 9, 2023
Image Source: France24.com
Summary
In September 2023, Niger experienced sustained jihadist aggression, predominantly by the Islamic State (Sahel), targeting primarily the military. This trend, reflecting the security dynamics of August, underscores the enduring threat posed by jihadist factions, especially in the southwestern regions. Post-coup political instability likely creates a conducive environment for jihadist elements to operate. The defense pact with Mali and Burkina Faso, signed in September, marks a regional effort to enhance security, though its effectiveness remains uncertain amidst Niger's internal tumult. Escalating public unrest, likely driven by economic hardships and external sanctions, alongside the uncertain European military support, indicates a widening security vacuum. These converging factors present a multi-faceted security challenge, likely fueling the escalation of jihadist activities and growing public discontent. The broader implication hints at a precarious security outlook extending beyond Niger to the wider Sahelian region, should the prevailing political and security challenges persist.
Background
Niger had shown relative success in curbing jihadist activities in recent years, a trend disrupted by the shift to junta governance in 2023 which brought Niger closer to the militaristic stances of its neighbors, epitomized by the “Alliance of Sahel States” mutual assistance and collective defense pact signed on September 16 with Mali and Burkina Faso. This shift away from former President Bazoum’s engagement strategies with militants threatens to fuel the resurgent jihadist violence observable since August, notably against the military in the southwest. The socio-economic terrain is severely strained by sanctions from ECOWAS and European entities, disrupting crucial trade, escalating basic commodity prices, and amplifying public discontent. The anti-French sentiment among the junta and public led to France's announcement on September 24 to withdraw its troops by year's end, signaling a shift in Western security cooperation. The spectrum of security threats across Niger's regions continues to morph, with jihadist groups, banditry, and criminal gangs exploiting the unstable environment. The junta's policies indicate a military-centric stance against these threats, potentially reversing the relative containment of jihadist activities seen in previous years. Amid these dynamics, the junta's priorities remain ambiguous, injecting unpredictability into the security landscape.
Analysis
- Jihadist aggression and strategic confrontations in the southwest, chiefly by Islamic State (Sahel) factions, likely aims to further weaken the state’s security apparatus and its public legitimacy. The targeted assaults on military personnel, mirroring the threat trajectory from August, indicate a potentially emboldened jihadist front, likely finding leverage amidst the prevailing political disarray post-coup. The junta's deviation from the non-military engagement strategies under President Bazoum's tenure is likely exacerbating this jihadist resurgence, with this policy stance likely increasing resentment amongst jihadist elements.
- The increase in public unrest is likely a result of the exacerbation of Niger’s chronic food insecurity due to external sanctions and growing economic duress. This unrest is likely being exacerbated by the ongoing violence across the country, notably by the Sahelian insurgency in the west, ISWAP and Boko Haram insurgency in the southeast, and banditry across central and northern regions. The public is likely increasingly polarized in their support for the junta, with pro-regime camps likely blaming the junta for the ongoing crisis and pro-junta camps likely blaming French and Western imperialism.
Forecast
- The persistent jihadist aggression, particularly by Islamic State (Sahel), will very likely escalate given the prevailing political instability and rollback of earlier non-military engagement strategies. The escalation of jihadist activities will very likely magnify domestic and international discontent for junta governance. Public dissatisfaction will very likely drive public protests, likely leading to violence between pro-regime and pro-junta camps. Ongoing insurgencies and groups like Boko Haram, JNIM, IS Sahel, and ISWAP will likely exploit and profit from this instability, likely resulting in a further escalation of violence.
- The reshaping of international security cooperation, highlighted by France's withdrawal, will very likely lead to a reassessment of security strategies both within Niger and amongst its regional and international partners. Jihadist elements will very likely attempt to fill the power vacuum left by France’s departure, likely resulting in a significant increase in operations towards the end of 2023 and in the beginning of 2024. Russia will very likely increase its disinformation campaigns against the West and offer its assistance in fighting jihadist violence to strengthen its presence in the country and broader Sahelian theater.
- The evolving dynamics within the junta, whose priorities remain unclear, will likely add an element of unpredictability to the security outlook. Niger socioeconomic conditions will likely continue to worsen because of the ongoing sanctions and absence of a political solution. The economic strain, marked by disrupted trade and soaring commodity prices, is likely to fuel further public unrest. The junta will likely erode fundamental rights and civil liberties, such as the freedoms of expression and press, to suppress public uprisings against their governance.
- The formation of the Alliance of Sahel States will likely impact how external actors, including Western and other foreign powers, engage with Niger and its new allies, possibly altering the geopolitical and security calculus in the Sahel. As these nations draw closer, they will likely collectively resist external pressures to restore democratic governance, likely leading to a protracted standoff with ECOWAS and other international entities. The regional bloc's continued threats of force will likely escalate tensions, possibly pushing these military-led states towards seeking alternative security partnerships and further polarizing the region along lines of governance models and external alliances.
